上市公司股利政策中英文对照外文文献翻译

2024年2月7日发(作者：)

上市公司股利政策中英文对照外文文献翻译

上市公司股利政策中英文对照

外文文献翻译

文献出处：Brunzell T, Liljeblom E, L?flund A, et al. Dividend

policy in Nordic listed firms [J]. Global Finance Journal, 2014,

25(2): 124-135.

原文

Dividend policy in Nordic listed firms

Tor, Eva, Anders, Mika

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the results from a survey among all

publicly listed Nordic firms on their dividend payout policy. The

results show that 72% of the Nordic companies have a specified

dividend policy. Larger and more profitable companies are more

likely to have a defined dividend policy in place. The dividend

policy is mostly influenced by capital structure considerations

and the outlook of future earnings. We also find that the

likelihood for a firm having an explicit dividend policy is

positively related to ownership concentration as well as to the

presence of large long-term private or industrial owners. Our

results support the use of defined dividend policies for agency or

monitoring reasons rather than signaling reasons.

Keywords: Corporate finance; Dividend policy; Payout;

NASDAQ OMX

Introduction

Ever since studies such as Lintner (1956) and Fama and

Babiak (1968), a large number of papers have studied corporate

dividend policies (payout ratios) and factors that contribute to

the payout decision. Recently, focus has been on the choice

between dividends and share repurchases (see for example Guay

and Harford, 2000 and Jagannathan et al., 2000; and Skinner,

2008), the question of disappearing dividends (see for example

DeAngelo et al., 2004 and Fama and French, 2001), and the

relationship between minority protection and dividends (see for

example Faccio et al., 2001 and La Porta et al., 2000). Typically,

the dividend payout is found to be a function of factors such as

profitability of the company, stability of the earnings, rate of

growth, free cash flows, and more recently, the governing

structure of the company. In their survey of dividend policies,

DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2008) conclude that a simple

asymmetric information framework does a good job at

explaining observed payout policies. This framework

emphasizes the need to distribute free cash flow in the presence

of agency costs and security valuation problems. They also

conclude that other motives and factors such as signaling, tax

preferences, and clientele demands have at best minor influences,

but that behavioral biases at the managerial level (such as

overconfidence) and the idiosyncratic preferences of controlling

shareholders plausibly have a first order impact.

We contribute to the literature on studies of the relationship

between controlling shareholders and dividend decisions by

studying the determinants of whether a firm follows a more

explicit dividend policy. While implicit dividend policies (most

commonly the relationship between dividends and earnings, and

the speed of adjustment to an assumed optimal level) have been

subject of many studies, only a few papers have studied whether

a company has an explicit defined dividend

policy in place, and what factors are related to the choice of

that policy (exceptions include Baker, Saadi, Dutta, & Gandhi,

2007; and Brav, Graham, Harvey, & Michaely, 2005).

There are many reasons for why the question of whether the

firm follows a clearly defined dividend policy may be of interest.

Firstly, it can be seen as an alternative approach to study whether

signaling can be one of the motives for dividend distributions.

Without expectations for future dividends, formulated by some

systematic publicly announced dividend policy, deviations from

such expectations cannot be identified and reacted upon. Thus,

one could view a ?dividend policy?as a necessary but not

sufficient condition for dividends to convey information about

future earnings. Secondly, a systematic and defined dividend

policy may also be required by dominant corporate owners. The

policy may solve agency problems between minority owners and

large owners in firms with concentrated ownership (La Porta et

al., 2000), and optimize taxation or satisfy large owners'

preference for a more predictable dividend stream.

Literature review and hypothesis development

There exists a vast literature on corporate dividend policy.

The main determinants of a corporate dividend policy include tax

optimizing, firm profitability

and earnings stability, signaling (of firm investment policy)

and managerial or majority owner related agency costs. There are

a number of papers that study which factors are considered by

companies when setting their dividend policy. Early results

indicate that taxes play a role if taxation on capital gains and

dividends differ, but if they do not differ, taxation does not play

a major role (Amihud & Murgia, 1997). In addition, the

profitability of the company and the stability of its earnings play

a major role in the dividend policy (see for example Barclay, Smith,

& Watts, 1995 and Gaver & Gaver, 1993). Other significant factors

include, among others, company's (expected) growth rate and

investment opportunities and signaling about the quality of the

firm's investment potential (see for example Fama and French,

2001 and Michaely et al., 1996 and Myers & Majluf, 1984). Finally,

La Porta, L ópez de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) observe

that companies tend to pay higher dividends in countries where

minority shareholders have greater protection.

A dividend policy can be formulated in several ways. In the

Lintner (1956) study, the most common specification was based

on the long-run target payout ratio. Current earnings are the

main determinant of the current dividend while deviations from

the target represent the signaling component. Dividend per

share is another potential dividend policy target and is only

weakly linked to current earnings performance through the

corporate history. Dividends may also be related to other

currently observable measures such as the company's stock price.

Data

The survey data

This paper is based on the results of a questionnaire directed

to all chairpersons of the Board of firms in the Nordic countries

(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden). this paper lists

the questions used in the survey.

The survey was conducted in two stages. In the first stage,

the questionnaire was sent to the chairmen in the Nordic firms

listed on the exchanges operated by the OMX (now NASDAQ

OMX) including the national stock markets of Denmark, Finland,

Iceland, and Sweden. This took place in early December 2007. In

the second stage, in May 2008, the questionnaire was sent to the

chairmen in the firms listed at the Oslo

B?rs in Norway. The questionnaire was sent as a letter

directed to a named respondent. The names and addresses of the

chairmen were hand-collected into a database. Ultimately, the

questionnaire was sent to 780 firms in total.

Background data

The responses were matched with background information

on firm financials and ownership concentration. The financial

data are collected from three sources. Our primary source is the

Amadeus database. Additional items have been collected from

Datastream, when not available in Amadeus. Finally, annual

reports downloaded from internet sources have provided an

additional data source in cases where information has not been

available in other databases. The financials are from the last

reporting year completed prior to the questionnaire was sent out.

This period is year-end 2006 for Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and

Sweden and year 2007 for Norway. Year-end exchange rates have

been used to convert all financials to the same currency, euro,

which already was the currency of Finland. Financial data were

collected not only for responding firms, but also for the whole

market, to facilitate relating our sample to the whole population

of the survey.

Results

We asked the chairpersons to indicate whether their

company had a defined dividend policy. Two alternatives (‘yes’

and ‘no’) were given. Panel A shows the results. Out of the 158

responses we got from the chairpersons, 152 provided an answer

to this question. 110 companies (72.4%) had a defined dividend

policy, 42 (27.6%) did not.

Conclusions

The results of our extensive survey among Nordic listed firms

on their commitment to dividend policy show that 72% of the

Nordic companies have a specified dividend policy. Furthermore,

the results indicate that the dividend policies are mostly

influenced by the considerations of the company's capital

structure and future earnings.

In estimations studying the determinants for whether a firm

has an explicit dividend policy or not, we find that firms with

older chairmen appear to prefer a

looser commitment to payout policy as their firms are

significantly less likely to have an explicit dividend policy in place.

We also documented that larger and more profitable companies

are more likely to commit to a defined dividend policy.

Finally, the likelihood for a firm having an explicit dividend

policy is significantly positively related to ownership

concentration as well as to large long-term private or industrial

owners. This gives indirect support for agency/monitoring

motives rather than the signaling motive which is expected to be

more prevalent in firms with dispersed ownership. Overall, our

results suggest that the relatively concentrated ownership

structures in Nordic firms play a role in shaping dividend policy

over traditional tax or signaling based rationales for a dividend

policy. References

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Determinants of capital